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Abstract  
This paper is concerned with whether the persistence of the Lucas paradox (that unlike 
what the classical economic theory would predict, capital flows to richer economies rather 
than poorer ones where marginal returns to capital are expected to be higher) within 
developing countries is because of the unobservable county-specific effects. Perhaps capital 
has been flowing to where it has already flowed and not necessarily where it had already 
been. Using five-year (rolling-averaged) panel data for up to 47 developing countries over the 
period 1980-2006, it examines if including the institutional quality index removes the Lucas 
paradox intertemporally (i.e. in the short-run). The ‘short-run’ relationships are captured by 
employing linear static (principally within-group fixed effects) and dynamic (system GMM) 
panel data methods. I demonstrate that the persistence in the Lucas paradox within 
developing countries is so entrenched that allowing for unobserved country-specific effects, 
within-group (time series) variation and autoregressive dynamics do not resolve the paradox.  
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1. Introduction 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators using time-aggregated (long-term averaged) data 
for cross-sections are charged not to take the intertemporal dependence into account but fit 
mainly long-run steady-state equilibrium models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Sinn, 1992). 
In such cross-section models, the unobservable country-specific fixed effects that are 
correlated with the observed characteristics (i.e. explicitly controlled variables) included in 
the model can cause statistical difficulties in estimation: potential aggregation bias, loss of 
information (due to absorbed time variation), inconsistency and inefficiency. Neither can they 
account for the causes of behavioural persistence since they are unable to control for true 
state dependence (autoregressivity, especially in the dependent variable).1  
Drawing largely on the theoretical considerations in Keskinsoy (2017), this paper 
addresses the methodological and measurement issues discussed above. It is concerned with 
the question: Is it (the persistence of the Lucas paradox within developing countries, as 
documented in Keskinsoy, 2017) because of the unobservable county-specific effects or is it 
actually due to the persistence of the capital in flowing to a certain market but appears as if its 
initial abundance in that market spurs further inflows? In other words, perhaps capital has 
been flowing to where it has already flowed and not necessarily where it had already been. 
Using five-year (rolling-averaged) panel data for up to 47 developing countries over the 
period 1980-2006, it examines if including the institutional quality index removes the Lucas 
paradox intertemporally (i.e. in the short-run). The ‘short-run’ relationships are captured by 
employing linear static (principally within-group fixed effects) and dynamic (system GMM) 
panel data methods (Pesaran and Smith, 1995, Houthakker, 1965, Baltagi and Griffin, 1984).2 
In this paper, I additionally investigate the short-run prognoses of Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(1997) who, in contrast to Lucas (1988, 1990), argue that economic growth, development and 
capital flow patterns are predicted by a neoclassical growth model augmented with 
assumptions of micro-level indivisibilities and uncertainty. According to their overlapping 
generations model of optimal portfolio choice, it is not a paradox at all (as it is already 
expected) that more foreign capital will flow to richer economies in the short-run. The data 
and methodology employed here enable such an empirical verification. Capital inflows per 
                                                 
1 In a time series context, state dependence means that state at a given moment depends on the previous state(s) 
of the system. 
2 Baltagi (2005) states that the between estimator (pooled OLS or equivalently cross-section OLS, which are 
based on the cross-section component of the data) tends to give long-run estimates while the within estimator 
(which is based on the time-series component of the data) tends to give short-run estimates. 
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capita (the dependent variable as the sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity investment) 
represent the cross-border risky financial investments in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). The 
initial endowments were captured by the initial GDP per capita while the risk-return trade-off 
(insurance, investment security or risk conditions) is embodied in the institutional quality 
variable. Static and dynamic panel estimators that fit to ‘time ’ notion let us analyse the 
short-run or dynamic implications of their model. Comprehensive review of the derivation of 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) results that are particularly considered here is in the appendix.  
[Table 1] 
To compare space (between) and time (within) variations in the data, coefficients of 
variation and percentage proportions for standard deviations of over-time and cross-country 
averaged data are given in Table 1. Notwithstanding the fact that between coefficients of 
variation are larger for all variables, standard deviation proportions are either relatively close 
to each other or even higher in within cases for, at least, the first three most important 
variables. All in all, the figures in the table imply that time variation should not be ignored as 
incorporating time dimension through appropriate model specifications would not only 
alleviate aggregation bias but would also yield significant information and efficiency gains. 
Figure 1 shows per capita equity flows by subperiods. During the first two decades capital 
flows follow steadily declining trajectory and starting 1990s onwards the trend reverses in the 
direction of increase.     
[Figure 1] 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Econometric methodology is devised in Section 
2. Section 3 overviews the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Results from static 
panel estimators are examined in Section 4, while dynamic panel regressions discussed in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
Given small , relative to , I avail of cross-section asymptotics in building up the 
following sections.3  
                                                 
3  → ∞ asymptotics are more appropriate than  → ∞ asymptotics, even though  is practically fixed while  
can grow (Wooldridge, 2002). This is in fact the case in my country panel study. Nonetheless, if  is 
sufficiently large relative to  and one can assume rough independence in the cross section or make sure it to be 
so by introducing cluster robust estimators then the suitable approximations warranted (Ibid.).           
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2.1 Specification for Static Panel Estimators 
The static two-way error components population regression function for sample 
estimations can be written as: 
 = 
 +  + +  																																		 = 1,… ,; 			 = 1,… ,                 (1)  
where  is the dependent variable (five-year averaged inflows of portfolio equity and 
foreign direct investment expressed as capital inflows per capita) for country  and time 
period , 
 is a constant,  is the main regressor (the natural log of GDP per capita at first 
years of each panels),  is a 1 × ( − 1) row vector of any additional explanatory 
variables. The estimators of interest are the scalar  and ( − 1) × 1 column vector ; 
 ≥ 1 being the number of covariates.  will be capturing the Lucas paradox and  the 
influence of the other regressors on capital inflows (and whether they account for, that is 
remove, the paradox). Assuming , the composite disturbances, follow a generalized two-
way error components structure 
 =  +   + !																																 = 1,… ,; 			 = 1,… , 					                     (2)      
where  refers to country specific unobservable fixed effects,   denotes period-specific 
effects which are assumed to have fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time 
dummies, and ! denotes idiosyncratic errors.  
Each of the three static panel data models (pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects) 
applied specifies different orthogonality, rank and efficiency assumptions about the elements 
of  and  in terms of conditional expectations, invertibility and variances. Pooled OLS 
(POLS) assumes that  is fixed over time and has a constant partial impact on the mean 
response in each time period. If  is correlated with any element of , then POLS estimator 
is biased and inconsistent. Because POLS does not offer any solution for potential cross 
section heterogeneity I consider two other estimators. Fixed effects model (FEM) allows for 
arbitrary correlation between  and  by relaxing the orthogonality assumption and deals 
with this through within transformation; time demeaning of Equation (1) removes observed 
and unobserved fixed effects. More intuitively, FEM accounts for unobserved country effects 
that are correlated with  but ‘sweeps up’ time-invariant variables. On the other hand, 
random effects model (REM) involves generalized least squares (GLS) transformation under 
stricter orthogonality assumptions. REM estimator is obtained by quasi time demeaning 
which implies the removal of only a pre-estimated fraction of the time averages. Having the 
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advantage of explicitly allowing for time-invariant variables REM favoured over FEM if 
country effects are uncorrelated with  but is inconsistent if FEM is the true model. It is 
standard to choose between FEM and REM using a cross section-time series adapted version 
of the Hausman specification test. To avoid heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in ! I 
employ the Huber/White/sandwich cluster robust estimator. 
2.2 Representation of Dynamic Panel Estimators 
As many economic relationships are inherently dynamic (Nerlove, 2002), the dynamics of 
adjustment can be represented by a dynamic two-way error components population 
regression: 
 = 
 + "#$% +  +  + 													 = 1,… ,; 				 = 1, … , ; 				& = 1, 2         (3) 
where "#$ is the vector containing the lags of the dependent variable (capital inflows per 
capita) as regressors rendering (3) to include an autoregressive process. The parameter vector 
% involves the scalars measuring the extent of state dependence (inertia), and the composite 
disturbance term is similarly specified as a two-way error components mechanism 
 =  +   + !																																 = 1,… ,; 			 = 1,… , 					                     (4) 
where  represents, as before, state-specific effects, and   denotes period-specific effects 
which are assumed to have fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies.  
In a dynamic specification of the kind in (3) POLS, within-group FEM, and REM do not 
take the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable into consideration and produce biased 
and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach is 
required. Because my short time panel data are highly persistent I use the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) system GMM estimator which entails contemporaneous first differences to instrument 
the levels of the endogenous variables and past (two-period or earlier) lagged levels to 
instrument the first differences of the same variables simultaneously.4 Because I conjecture 
                                                 
4 Blundell and Bond (1998) show that as the concentration parameter approaches to zero, i.e. the data series 
becomes more persistent, the conventional instrumental variable estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991) difference 
GMM) performs poorly. They attribute the bias and the poor precision of the first-difference GMM estimator to 
the problem of weak instruments. Under the extra moment conditions of Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Arellano 
and Bover (1995), with short T and persistent series Blundell and Bond (1998) also show that an additional mild 
stationarity restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an extended system GMM estimator 
that has dramatic efficiency gains over the basic first-difference GMM. These results are reviewed and 
empirically verified by Blundell and Bond (2000). In this study the time length is quite short as  = 5 most of 
the cases. In each of the simple autoregressive POLS with no exogenous regressors (results from which are 
available upon request) the positively significant (all at 1%) coefficients on the first lags of capital inflows per 
capita, real per capita initial output and institutional quality are respectively around 0.765,  0.912 and 0.698. 
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that only the lags of the dependent variable are structurally endogenous in my framework and 
the Hausman regressor endogeneity tests corroborate this I assume all the remaining 
explanatory variables to be strictly exogenous throughout the entire dynamic model 
estimations.5 As a result, the composite instrument matrix with varying dimensions according 
to the relevant specification is composed of two blocks: GMM-style instruments for the 
lagged dependent variables and conventional IV-style instruments (essentially the rest of the 
covariates instrument themselves). I prefer the GMM instruments to be collapsed to create 
one instrument for each variable and lag distance rather than one for each time period, 
variable and lag distance since GMM estimators, including 2SLS and 3SLS, using too many 
over-identifying restrictions are known to have poor finite sample properties and to decrease 
the test powers.6 Small-sample adjustment, two-step estimator optimization, and Windmeijer 
(2005) finite-sample corrected cluster-robust standard errors used in all GMM applications. 
3. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
Data are organized as five-year sub-period moving averages (1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 
1995-99 and 2000-2006) over 1980-2006 for up to 47 developing countries. Variable 
definitions and sources are in the appendix. Data availability may limit the number of 
countries or periods for some variables. Given the panel structure, data in the first year of 
each sub-period are used as initial values for per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and 
gross capital formation (GCF), so some time variation is incorporated in addition to the 
variation across countries.  
[Table 2] 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the five-year panel sample. Inserting time series 
information via sub-period averaging provides larger sample sizes, mean realizations, overall 
variations and ranges of almost all variables. Estimation efficiency and precision in short-run 
regressions are expected to improve due to degrees-of-freedom gains as a result of 
disaggregation.  
[Table 3] 
Table 3 reports pairwise correlations for the variables using the Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients. Equity flows per capita is highly correlated with all the other 
                                                 
5 Endogeneity issues are exclusively examined in the static panel instrumental variable regressions section.    
6 See Tauchen (1986), Altonji and Segal (1996), Ziliak (1997), Sargan (1958), Bowsher (2002) and Roodman 
(2009). 
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variables (in the expected direction) except for total factor productivity growth. Initial per 
capita purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP has the highest positive correlation, with 
average years of schooling (0.707), the highest negative correlation, with country risk. This is 
unsurprising in the sense that relatively wealthier countries at the outset have better schooling 
and creditworthiness in subsequent years.  
4. Static Panel Estimations 
Three static panel data estimators are employed: pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), 
within-group fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM). In order to save 
space results of all these models are reported for only one specification in each table. For the 
other specifications, either FEM or REM results are given. To choose between FEM and 
REM, I first estimate the model with cluster-robust random effects. Then, I apply a panel 
data-adjusted version of the Sargan-Hansen over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test (Schaffer 
and Stillman, 2016).7 Based on the test results, I finally choose fixed effects if the )-value is 
smaller than 0.10; and random effects otherwise. As economic theory suggests (that 
unobserved country-specific effects are likely to be correlated with the observable 
characteristics in , see above) and econometric tests mostly confirm, FEM is the preferred 
estimator.  
4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 4 reports the basic static panel data regression results. Since the Sargan-Hansen OIR 
test implies that REM is inconsistent only FEM estimates are given under the first 
specification. Controlling for time invariant country-specific heterogeneity, fixed effects 
estimation shows that capital moves to relatively wealthier economies; allowing for within-
group variation the Lucas paradox exists. Under models (2) and (3), fixed effects (likewise 
POLS and REM) estimates for initial income and institutions are positive and highly 
significant (at 1% and 5% respectively). Hence, the quality of institutions cannot explain the 
paradox for developing countries in the short-run when time series variations are also taken 
into account. 
[Table 4] 
Table 5 includes additional covariates. The fraction of the composite error variance due to 
unobservable country-specific fixed effects (ρ) is very high leading the Sargan-Hansen OIR 
                                                 
7 Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-91) propose more technical approaches for this test. 
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test to always reject the asymptotic appropriateness of the REM. Following the practices in 
some empirical papers testing the postulations of gravity models of trade I include both fixed 
distance and time varying remoteness variables simultaneously under the remaining 
regressions.8 In line with the models under (2) and (3) in the previous table, all of the Table 5 
estimations demonstrate that within developing countries the paradox prevails, not only 
across countries but also over time no matter how significant are the additional explanatory 
variables. 
[Table 5] 
4.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
Through a number of alternative specifications with different proxy variables I document 
that all of the static panel within-group fixed effects, pooled OLS and random effects GLS 
techniques consistently deliver similar estimates that are implicationally robust. 9 Regressions 
reported in Table 6 include some aspects of the host country economic fundamentals 
alongside initial GDP per capita and institutional quality. Validated by the pertinent OIR 
tests, REM under (1) and (3) and FEM under (2) show that the paradox is still left 
unexplained despite controlling for corporate tax, trade openness and deposit money bank 
assets as well as institutions.  
[Table 6] 
From Table 7 it seems as if institutional quality accounts for the capital flows and the 
Lucas paradox under FEM (2) but when I replace initial income with initial GCF in FEM (2) 
of Table 5 the quality of institutions variable is not significant whilst initial capital stock is. 
Albeit not equivalently consistent, POLS and REM yield the results (unreported) that they 
both are significant under (2). All the other regressions maintain the finding that the paradox 
unresolved for developing countries.  
[Table 7] 
Table 8 reports the results considering proxy variables for sovereign risk (average risk 
level, OECD taxonomy), international knowledge spillovers (average international voice 
                                                 
8 See Brun et al. (2005), Guttmann and Richards (2006), and Coe et al. (2007) for empirical; and Deardorff 
(1998), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for theoretical treatments. 
9 Outliers detecting added variable plots (available upon request) indicate that Chile and Panama may have 
influential observations. My key results are left unaltered, however, when I drop either of them in turn or 
suppress both at once.    
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traffic) and asymmetric information (average foreign bank asset share). The relevant 
estimations throughout the table reassure that including country risk, global phone traffic and 
foreign bank penetration have no influence at all on the prevalence of the paradox. 
[Table 8] 
4.3 Static Panel Instrumental Variable Regressions 
It might be the case that there is a feedback from capital inflows per capita (the dependent 
variable) to the quality of institutions (one of the key regressors). More generally, there may 
be an omitted variable that influences both of these. Thus, one cannot discount the possibility 
of endogeneity of the institutional quality variable. To address this I adopt a panel 
instrumental variables approach. Table 9 below gives the linear cross section-time series 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions in addition to the first stage and primary panel data 
estimations throughout Panels A, B and C. Under (1) and (2) institutional quality is 
instrumented solely by the time invariant variable of log European settler mortality. Since this 
implicit instrument does not change over time FEM estimators do not work properly so that I 
am unable to report any within-group estimate. Considering all the other two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) for POLS and generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS) for REM results, 
Hausman regressor endogeneity tests suggest that the corresponding models in Panels A and 
C are asymptotically equivalent. Excessively larger standard errors in Panel A reinforces this 
also that institutional quality is actually exogenous to the conventional static panel 
specifications. As a last remark, the second part of Panel C shows that the Lucas paradox 
persists even within the adjusted sample. 
[Table 9] 
To see whether the colonizer mortality (main instrument) is excludable in the second stage 
and to test the validity of all the instruments I run further two-way error components IV 
regressions and provide the results under specification (3) in Table 9. Here I additionally 
employ fixed but observable variables of British legal origin and English language as implicit 
instruments besides explicitly controlling for European settler mortality as another instrument 
for the quality of institutions. Albeit Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions validates 
those instruments, the Hausman regressor endogeneity test and very high standard errors 
(Panel A) imply that institutional quality is independent from the idiosyncratic errors (i.e. 
exogenous). 
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5. Dynamic Panel Estimations 
As noted above, to capture dynamic relationships consistently I employ two-way error 
components models of generalized method of moments (GMM). I report results from the 
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator as the main variables of interest are quite 
persistent over time.10      
5.1 Fundamental Results 
Through six dynamic model settings Table 10 provides the system GMM results testing 
the presence of the Lucas paradox and looking whether it disappears when allowing for 
institutional quality and other control variables. Specification fitted under (1) once again 
shows that the paradox indeed exists within this autoregressive dynamic panel framework. 
Inclusion of the quality of institutions leaves the paradox unresolved as in the static panel 
cases. In parallel with these, estimations controlling for human capital, unilateral distance, 
capital controls and remoteness in addition to initial income and institutions demonstrate that 
the Lucas paradox persists when the autoregressivity in the dependent variable is allowed for. 
Also there is positively significant (one period) state dependence under all specifications in 
the table.   
[Table 10] 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
Controlling for trade openness, level of financial sector development, total factor 
productivity growth, initial capital stock per capita, malaria incidence and international 
communication traffic in Table 11 do not alter the mainstay of the dynamics characterized 
above. Coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable give a monotonic adjustment to a 
shock that is over after two 5-year periods. The positive significance of the first lag 
effectively narrows this decay to a 5-year period. This is consistent with my interpretation of 
the estimates from the five-year panel data as the short-run parameters in that it takes five 
years for an impact on the contemporaneous capital flows (i.e. ) to die out, after which  
reverts to its long-run level.11    
[Table 11] 
                                                 
10 Arellano-Bond difference GMM results are demoted to the appendix.   
11 Because  ≤ 2 for corporate tax, country risk and foreign bank penetration the dynamic models including 
them are unspecified. Hence, I am unable to report robustness checks for those extra explanatory variables.        
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6. Conclusion  
This paper augments the analysis in Keskinsoy (2017) by implementing static (including 
within-group fixed effects) and dynamic (system GMM) panel estimators. These estimators 
are used to capture short-run dynamic relationships and to deal with any possible omitted 
variables problem. For a panel of five-year moving averages over 1980-2006 and for 47 
developing countries, the paper probes whether the wealth bias in international financial 
flows (the Lucas paradox) is resolved in the short-run. It also tests if the short-run predictions 
of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) hold. I demonstrate that the persistence in the Lucas 
paradox within developing countries is so entrenched that allowing for unobserved country-
specific effects, within-group (time series) variation and autoregressive dynamics do not 
resolve the paradox.            
The results are identical within and across static panel data methods. Within-group fixed 
effects regressions imply (as equivalently consistent random effects GLS regressions do in 
some cases) that the paradox remains in the short-run for developing economies. Although 
institutional quality has positive impact on capital flows to these economies, it is unable to 
resolve the wealth bias. Capturing the dynamics and controlling for endogeneity, Blundell-
Bond style system GMM estimations indicate that the existence and persistence of the Lucas 
paradox is an intertemporal phenomenon within developing countries. They also show that 
real capital flows per capita have positive, one five-year period state dependence or inertia. 
This additionally justifies the short-run interpretation throughout the paper.  
The persistence in the Lucas paradox and associated non-convergence in real incomes, 
factor prices and returns could be attributed to a Linder-type home bias in international 
finance. It may also be the case that excessive volatility in financial markets and related 
behavioural anomalies in certain types of external funding breed the negative shocks that 
cancel out the effects of positive shocks. This may eventually give rise to a permanent 
diversion in the direction of funding. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Standard Deviation Decompositions and Coefficients of Variation of the Data 
 
Proportional Deviations  Coef. of Variation 
Variables Annual Sample  5-Year Sample  Annual Sample 
 
Between Within  Between Within  Between Within 
Per capita equity flows 46.81 53.19  51.92 48.08  1.40 0.65 
Per capita initial GDP  100 0  49.41 50.59  0.67 — 
Institutional quality 43.84 56.16  46.42 53.58  0.11 0.10 
Average years of schooling 64.55 35.45  64.55 35.45  0.45 0.23 
Weighted-average remoteness 86.43 13.57  87.89 12.11  0.19 0.01 
Capital mobility barriers 44.49 55.51  48.35 51.65  0.31 0.16 
Corporate tax rate 70.39 29.61  79.90 20.10  0.18 0.02 
Trade openness 66.29 33.71  69.66 30.34  0.49 0.12 
Deposit money bank assets 58.32 41.68  59.12 40.88  0.56 0.21 
TFP growth 26.26 73.74  38.26 61.74  -6.81 -4.38 
Per capita initial GCF  100 0  55.84 44.16  1.04 — 
Malaria contagion risk  100 0  100 0  0.87 — 
Risk level, OECD 78.93 21.07  81.81 18.19  0.30 0.02 
International voice traffic 73.46 26.54  75.37 24.63  1.85 1.11 
Foreign bank asset share 77.77 22.23  84.62 15.38  0.93 0.12 
Notes: Equity flows are the sum of international portfolio equity and direct investment inflows expressed in 
constant 2005 US dollars divided by the total population. Percentage proportions for standard deviations of each 
variable across countries, between, versus over time, within, under annually observed and five-year averaged 
samples. Cross country (time averaged data) and over time (country averaged data) coefficient of variations are 
calculated for annual sample only. GCF is gross capital formation.  
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Figure 1: Capital Inflows per Capita by Sub-periods, 1970-2006 
 
Notes: See notes to Table1.  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Five-Year Panel Data 
Variables Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Per capita equity flows 231 51.047 78.533 -147.875 482.952 
Per capita initial GDP ($PPP) 231 3.439 2.303 0.406 11.647 
Institutional quality 231 5.733 1.103 3.168 7.804 
Average years of schooling 231 4.352 1.887 0.370 9.740 
GDP- weighted average remoteness 231 8.913 1.617 5.840 12.501 
Average capital mobility barriers 231 0.585 0.303 0.000 1.000 
Corporate tax rate 68 30.118 5.542 15.000 42.220 
Trade openness 231 64.961 35.735 12.146 207.290 
Deposit money bank assets 212 0.355 0.251 0.040 1.526 
TFP growth 180 -0.422 2.675 -8.390 5.166 
Per capita initial GCF (2005 $US)  230 0.524 0.482 0.019 2.783 
Malaria contagion risk as of 1994 141 0.418 0.398 0.000 1.000 
Risk level, OECD 94 5.106 1.542 2.000 7.000 
International voice traffic 160 27.011 42.203 0.066 289.080 
Foreign bank asset share 77 0.224 0.202 0.006 0.900 
Notes: See notes to Table 1.  
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Table 3: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients, Five-Year Panel Data  
 
Equity 
Flows pc 
Log  pc 
IGDP 
Quality of 
Institutions 
Log   
Schooling 
Log 
Distance 
Barriers to 
Cap. Mob. 
L. pc IGDP 
p-value 
0.444 
0.000   
   
Institutions  
p-value 
0.508 
0.000 
0.496 
0.000  
   
Log schooling 
p-value 
0.367 
0.000 
0.707 
0.000 
0.424 
0.000  
  
Log distance 
p-value 
0.103 
0.033 
0.101 
0.036 
0.090 
0.146 
0.273 
0.000  
 
Restrictions 
p-value 
-0.307 
0.000 
-0.258 
0.000 
-0.385 
0.000 
-0.208 
0.000 
-0.172 
0.000  
Corporate tax  
p-value 
-0.236 
0.043 
-0.082 
0.487 
-0.197 
0.102 
-0.069 
0.565 
0.033 
0.782 
0.099 
0.400 
Log openness 
p-value 
0.359 
0.000 
0.287 
0.000 
0.261 
0.000 
0.180 
0.001 
-0.020 
0.675 
-0.329 
0.000 
L. Bank assets  
p-value 
0.373 
0.000 
0.527 
0.000 
0.339 
0.000 
0.378 
0.000 
-0.020 
0.706 
-0.265 
0.000 
TFP growth  
p-value 
0.107 
0.125 
-0.062 
0.373 
0.106 
0.129 
-0.003 
0.968 
0.057 
0.410 
-0.175 
0.012 
Log pc IGCF  
p-value 
0.454 
0.000 
0.687 
0.000 
0.368 
0.000 
0.514 
0.000 
0.046 
0.359 
-0.187 
0.000 
Malaria  
p-value 
-0.250 
0.000 
-0.539 
0.000 
-0.295 
0.000 
-0.461 
0.000 
0.029 
0.563 
0.018 
0.728 
Country risk 
p-value 
-0.237 
0.010 
-0.578 
0.000 
-0.553 
0.000 
-0.449 
0.000 
-0.113 
0.229 
0.090 
0.336 
Voice traffic 
p-value 
0.626 
0.000 
0.374 
0.000 
0.379 
0.000 
0.286 
0.000 
-0.120 
0.081 
-0.187 
0.006 
Foreign bank 
p-value 
-0.218 
0.043 
-0.348 
0.001 
-0.067 
0.544 
-0.195 
0.083 
0.215 
0.045 
-0.121 
0.266 
Notes: Barriers-to-Capital and Restrictions are interchangeably used terms for the same variable of average 
restrictions to and controls on capital mobility imposed by a country. The abbreviations L, I, and pc refer to 
‘logs’, ‘initial’ and ‘per capita’ respectively. Country observations change from pair to pair adjusting to data 
availability. See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4: Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
FEM POLS FEM REM FEM 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$)  
0.658*** 
(0.168) 
 
0.415*** 
(0.063) 
0.443*** 
(0.128) 
0.426*** 
(0.064) 
 
 
 
Average institutional quality  
 
 0.226*** 
(0.043) 
0.173** 
(0.065) 
0.207*** 
(0.047) 
 0.142** 
(0.063) 
Log average per capita 
GDP (PPP$) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.592*** 
(0.147) 
Observations 231  231 231 231  231 
Countries 47  47 47 47  47 
R
2
 0.236  0.424 0.276   0.300 
R
2
_Overall 0.358   0.421 0.423  0.428 
ρ 0.313   0.279 0.157  0.295 
Sargan-Hansen OIR  
Test (+-value) 
0.000    0.028  0.015 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant and time dummies included in all estimations. POLS, 
FEM, REM, and OIR are standing for pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects model, random effects model, 
and over-identifying restrictions respectively. ρ is known either as the fraction of the variance due to unobserved 
country-specific effects or as interclass correlation of the country-specific error. 
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Table 5: Static Panel Regressions with Alternative Covariates, 5-Year Panel Data 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
FEM POLS FEM  REM FEM 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.592** 
(0.240) 
 
0.375*** 
(0.089) 
0.531*** 
(0.194) 
0.400*** 
(0.096) 
 
 
 
Log average years  
of schooling 
0.161 
(0.310) 
 0.0478 
(0.107) 
-0.199 
(0.309) 
0.0357 
(0.111) 
 0.573** 
(0.225) 
Average institutional  
quality 
 
 
 0.180*** 
(0.044) 
0.0785 
(0.082) 
0.147*** 
(0.050) 
 0.124 
(0.091) 
Log average  
distance 
 
 
 -3.332 
(2.399) 
– 
 
-3.736* 
(2.040) 
 – 
 
Log average  
remoteness 
 
 
 3.571 
(2.489) 
5.278*** 
(1.734) 
3.975* 
(2.112) 
 5.977*** 
(2.032) 
Average restrictions  
to capital mobility 
 
 
 -0.313 
(0.233) 
-0.398 
(0.269) 
-0.323 
(0.205) 
 -0.368 
(0.277) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (2005 US$)  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.379** 
(0.178) 
Observations 231  231 231 231  231 
Countries 47  47 47 47  47 
R
2
 0.237  0.451 0.318   0.309 
R
2
_Overall 0.361   0.147 0.450  0.174 
ρ 0.313   0.774 0.167  0.839 
Sargan-Hansen OIR  
Test (+-value) 
0.000    0.000  0.000 
Notes: The dash “–” signifies automatic drop of corresponding regressor because of collinearity or model 
algorithm. See notes to Table 4.  
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Table 6: Robustness Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
REM POLS FEM  REM REM 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.712*** 
(0.126) 
 
0.410*** 
(0.063) 
0.475*** 
(0.155) 
0.417*** 
(0.065) 
 
0.457*** 
(0.073) 
Average institutional  
quality 
0.550*** 
(0.111) 
 0.212*** 
(0.042) 
0.176** 
(0.067) 
0.199*** 
(0.048) 
 0.229*** 
(0.050) 
Average corporate 
tax rate 
-0.0190 
(0.030) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Log average trade 
openness 
 
 
 0.131 
(0.102) 
-0.104 
(0.184) 
0.111 
(0.101) 
  
 
Log average deposit 
money bank assets  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.0222 
(0.081) 
Observations 68  231 231 231  212 
Countries 36  47 47 47  46 
R
2
   0.431 0.277    
R
2
_Overall 0.552   0.401 0.431  0.448 
ρ 0.603   0.298 0.149  0.123 
Sargan-Hansen OIR  
Test (+-value) 
0.169    0.004  0.179 
Notes: The number of observations may change due to data availability. See notes to Table 5.  
Table 7: Robustness Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
POLS FEM REM FEM REM 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.496*** 
(0.072) 
0.495*** 
(0.139) 
0.516*** 
(0.068) 
 
 
 
 
0.617*** 
(0.117) 
Average institutional  
quality 
0.229*** 
(0.059) 
0.0916 
(0.094) 
0.187*** 
(0.066) 
 0.251*** 
(0.075) 
 0.326*** 
(0.062) 
Log average  
TFP growth 
0.0305* 
(0.018) 
0.0377 
(0.024) 
0.0313* 
(0.019) 
  
 
  
 
Log per capita initial 
GCF (2005 $US) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.0291 
(0.108) 
  
 
Malaria contagion 
risk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 0.134 
(0.166) 
Observations 180 180 180  230  141 
Countries 39 39 39  47  47 
R
2
 0.501 0.293   0.237   
R
2
_Overall  0.485 0.499  0.330  0.480 
ρ  0.348 0.153  0.356  0.297 
Sargan-Hansen OIR  
Test (+-value) 
  0.006  0.000  0.174 
Notes: See notes to Table 6.  
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Table 8: Robustness Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
POLS FEM REM  FEM  REM 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.660*** 
(0.090) 
0.421 
(0.485) 
0.648*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.288* 
(0.166) 
 
0.598*** 
(0.169) 
Average institutional  
quality 
0.503*** 
(0.078) 
0.159 
(0.193) 
0.447*** 
(0.074) 
 0.186 
(0.132) 
 0.306*** 
(0.086) 
Average risk level,  
OECD taxonomy 
0.0108 
(0.062) 
-0.290 
(0.244) 
-0.0201 
(0.066) 
  
 
  
 
Average Int'l voice  
traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.0030 
(0.002) 
  
 
Average foreign  
bank asset share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 -0.434 
(0.476) 
Observations 94 94 94  160  77 
Countries 47 47 47  46  41 
R
2
 0.555 0.125   0.273   
R
2
_Overall  0.427 0.553  0.431  0.409 
ρ  0.627 0.406  0.372  0.431 
Sargan-Hansen OIR  
Test (+-value) 
  0.440  0.011  0.116 
Notes: See notes to Table 7.   
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Table 9: Static Panel IV Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
POLS  REM  POLS  REM  POLS  REM 
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Estimations 
Average institutional 
quality 
1.009*** 
(0.352) 
 1.007 
(0.620) 
 0.318 
(0.342) 
 0.286 
(0.361) 
 1.212* 
(0.734) 
 1.212 
(1.556) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.355 
(0.284) 
 0.370 
(0.324) 
    
Log European  
settler mortality 
        0.0427 
(0.177) 
 0.0434 
(0.376) 
Hausman RE (+) 0.374  0.756  0.999  0.999  0.859  0.988 
Sargan OIR (+)         0.812   
Panel B: First Stage for Average Institutional Quality  
Log European settler 
mortality 
-0.210** 
(0.084) 
 -0.212* 
(0.128) 
 0.166** 
(0.082) 
 0.212* 
(0.114) 
 -0.221** 
(0.085) 
 -0.222* 
(0.133) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.918*** 
(0.102) 
 1.023*** 
(0.123) 
    
British legal origin         -0.200 
(0.175) 
 -0.199 
(0.274) 
English language         0.473 
(0.408) 
 0.473 
(0.639) 
R
2
 0.137  0.137  0.397  0.396  0.146  0.146 
Panel C: Primary POLS and REM Regressions 
Average institutional 
quality 
0.392*** 
(0.045) 
 0.333*** 
(0.046) 
 0.230*** 
(0.050) 
 0.210*** 
(0.050) 
 0.371*** 
(0.045) 
 0.323*** 
(0.046) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
 
 
  
 
 0.426*** 
(0.072) 
 0.434*** 
(0.086) 
    
Log European  
settler mortality 
        -0.134** 
(0.052) 
 -0.145* 
(0.074) 
Observations 194  194  194  194  194  194 
Countries 39  39  39  39  39  39 
Notes: In Panels A and C the response variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per 
capita whereas in B it is the composite index of institutional quality. Hausman regressor endogeneity (RE) test 
compares each model between Panels A and C whilst Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test assesses the 
validity of model instruments. For both tests given are )-values. Standard errors are in parentheses. Consult also 
notes to Table 8.  
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Table 10: System GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 1 
0.606*** 
(0.123) 
0.564*** 
(0.133) 
0.536*** 
(0.138) 
0.598*** 
(0.125) 
0.531*** 
(0.150) 
0.541*** 
(0.135) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 2 
-0.257 
(0.196) 
-0.215 
(0.178) 
-0.218 
(0.177) 
-0.252 
(0.196) 
-0.189 
(0.160) 
-0.227 
(0.168) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.348*** 
(0.059) 
0.190*** 
(0.048) 
 
 
0.310*** 
(0.072) 
0.161** 
(0.073) 
 
 
Average institutional  
quality 
 
 
0.185*** 
(0.035) 
0.171*** 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.157*** 
(0.033) 
0.171*** 
(0.033) 
Log average per capita  
GDP (PPP$) 
  
0.247*** 
(0.054) 
   
Log average years  
of schooling 
   
0.0779 
(0.111) 
0.0645 
(0.096) 
0.0926 
(0.077) 
Log average  
distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.328 
(1.457) 
-2.175 
(1.437) 
Log average  
remoteness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.292 
(1.486) 
2.161 
(1.493) 
Average restrictions  
to capital mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.184 
(0.249) 
-0.175 
(0.235) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (2005 US$)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.153*** 
(0.050) 
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229 
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 
,- (+-value) 0.021 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.026 0.025 
,. (+-value) 0.624 0.527 0.516 0.610 0.474 0.636 
/01231	4 (+-value) 0.803 0.740 0.739 0.800 0.735 0.736 
Notes: All specifications comprise finite-sample adjustment, two-step estimator optimization and collapsed 
GMM-style instruments. Unreported constant and time dummies included in all estimations. 56 and 57 are the 
Arellano-Bond tests for first order and second order autocorrelations in the residuals whilst 89:&;:	< is the test 
of over-identifying restrictions for all the model instruments. Because sample size is not an entirely well-defined 
concept in system GMM which effectively runs on two samples (in levels and in first-differences) 
simultaneously, I report the size of the untransformed (level) sample. Windmeijer’s finite-sample corrected 
cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. See notes to Table 9.    
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Table 11: Robustness System GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 1 
0.566*** 
(0.128) 
0.548*** 
(0.134) 
0.552*** 
(0.144) 
0.599*** 
(0.121) 
0.511*** 
(0.110) 
0.539*** 
(0.124) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 2 
-0.205 
(0.180) 
-0.192 
(0.178) 
-0.0391 
(0.252) 
-0.249 
(0.178) 
-0.259 
(0.295) 
-0.355 
(0.280) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.191*** 
(0.050) 
0.247*** 
(0.050) 
0.225** 
(0.086) 
 
 
0.306** 
(0.115) 
0.279*** 
(0.089) 
Average institutional  
quality 
0.182*** 
(0.035) 
0.211*** 
(0.037) 
0.156*** 
(0.044) 
0.209*** 
(0.037) 
0.260*** 
(0.055) 
0.250*** 
(0.064) 
Log average trade 
openness 
0.0149 
(0.070) 
 
 
    
Log average deposit 
money bank assets  
 
 
-0.0441 
(0.050) 
    
Log average  
TFP growth 
  
0.0175 
(0.015) 
   
Log per capita initial 
GCF (2005 $US) 
   
0.0878** 
(0.036) 
  
Malaria contagion 
risk  
    
-0.0686 
(0.153) 
 
Log average Int'l  
voice traffic 
     
0.0029 
(0.034) 
Observations 229 212 178 228 141 160 
Countries 47 46 39 47 47 46 
,- (+-value) 0.026 0.034 0.057 0.026 0.043 0.047 
,. (+-value) 0.504 0.372 0.482 0.674 0.257 0.442 
/01231	4 (+-value) 0.744 0.750 0.626 0.778 0.584 0.743 
Notes: See notes to Table 10.   
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Appendix A: Capital Flows in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) 
International capital flows are modelled through a problem of optimal portfolio choice in a 
two-country world. The model assumptions are: (i) free international trade in final goods and 
financial instruments, (ii) intermediate goods cannot be traded internationally, (iii) both 
countries face identical constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies, micro-level 
indivisibilities (nonconvexities or inefficiencies implying that a certain minimum size 
investment or start-up cost is required to be productive) and uncertainty, (iv) there are two 
countries such that Country 1 is richer (has higher initial endowments) while Country 2 is 
poorer. Under these assumptions, there are two forces to be taken into account when 
comparing the profitability of investments in two different countries: risk diversification 
(larger stock of savings → more open or operating sectors → larger amount of intermediate 
goods ≡ more diversification opportunities in Country 1) and differential prices for 
intermediate goods (higher in Country 2, hence marginal product of capital is higher there). 
The risk-return trade-off that an agent faces is determined by these two forces. 
Because all agents can run any of the intermediate sector firms, can buy any security 
issued in either country and are equally distributed between the two countries; an agent 
ℎ ∈ Ω6 ∪ Ω7 is allowed to invest her funds in any combination of the two safe assets and 
2 × [0, 1] risky assets, where Ω is the set of young agents in Country  = 1,2 and [0, 1] is the 
unit interval. Uncertainty is considered by a continuum of equally likely states of nature such 
that an intermediate sector E ∈ [0, : , 1] pays a positive return only in state E and nothing 
otherwise. In each country, larger sectors will open after smaller ones and, presumably, the 
number of open projects in Country 1 is at least the same as in Country 2 (i.e. :6 ≥ :7). 
Since investing in a sector is equivalent to buying a basic Arrow security that pays in only 
one state of nature, dropping  (the time subscript) and ℎ (the agent indicator) for notational 
convenience, the optimal portfolio problem of the agent ℎ is written as     
max
IJ,IK,L,MJ,MK
:7 log QR6
(SJ)(T6 + UV6) + R7
(SJ)(T7 + UV7)W 
+(:6 − :7) log QR6
(SK)(TX + UV6) + R7
(SK)(UV7)W                         (A.1) 
+(1 − :6) log QR6
(SY)(UV6) + R7
(SY)(UV7)W 
subject to 
:7(6 + 7) + (:6 − :7)X + V6 + V7 = &∗                            (A.2) 
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 is the amount of savings invested in risky asset and [ ≥ \[ = max ]0, ^6#_ (E − `)a, where 
\[ is the minimum investment to ensure productivity or positive return and the expression on 
the right hand side (RHS) is its distribution function. There is no minimum investment 
requirement for the sectors to be open if they satisfy E ≤ `. For the rest of the sectors, the 
minimum investment requirement increases linearly in b	(> 0), which captures the presence 
of nonconvexities or indivisibilities that in turn shape the trade-off between insurance and 
productivity or risk and return. V is the amount of savings invested in safe asset that has a 
nonstochastic gross rate of return U	(< T), where T is the rate of return on or payoff from the 
investment in risky security. R refers interchangeably to the price of intermediate goods, the 
aggregate rate of return on safe and risky financial investments and the marginal product of 
capital. As intermediate goods are nontradable (Asmp. ii), R6[ ≠ R7[ . Given that :6 ≥ :7; if 
the realized state of nature is E ∈ f6 ≡ [0, :7], a risky investment in both countries will have 
a positive payoff. If E ∈ f7 ≡ [:7, :6], however, only risky investments in Country 1 will 
have a positive payoff. Finally, if E ∈ fg ≡ [:6, 1],  no risky projects will be successful. X is 
the amount of investment in risky assets of Country 1 such that ∀ℎ and ∀E, Ei ∈ [:7, :6], 
there exists 6[ = 6[
j ≡ X. From the constraint, &∗ is the optimal savings of the agent.                            
The equilibrium solutions can be characterized from the first order conditions of the form 
kKlJ
(mJ)n
lJ
(mJ)(nIJopMJ)olK
(mJ)(nIKopMK)
= q:7                                     (A.3) 
kKlK
(mJ)n
lJ
(mJ)(nIJopMJ)olK
(mJ)(nIKopMK)
= q:7                                     (A.4) 
(kJ#kK)lJ
(mK)n
lJ
(mK)(nLopMJ)olK
(mK)(pMK)
= q(:6 − :7)                                   (A.5) 
kKlJ
(mJ)p
lJ
(mJ)(nIJopMJ)olK
(mJ)(nIKopMK)
+ (kJ#kK)lJ
(mK)p
lJ
(mK)(nLopMJ)olK
(mK)(pMK)
+ (6#kJ)lJ
(mY)p
lJ
(mY)(pMJ)olK
(mY)(pMK)
= q     (A.6) 
kKlK
(mJ)p
lJ
(mJ)(nIJopMJ)olK
(mJ)(nIKopMK)
+ (kJ#kK)lK
(mK)p
lJ
(mK)(nLopMJ)olK
(mK)(pMK)
+ (6#kJ)lK
(mY)p
lJ
(mY)(pMJ)olK
(mY)(pMK)
= q     (A.7) 
Given that :7∗ < 1, from (A.3) and (A.4) it follows that R6
(SJ) = R7
(SJ), hence 
T6 + UV6 = T7 + UV7                                            (A.8) 
Using (A.3)-(A.5) to obtain the ratio 
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lJ
(mJ)
lJ
(mK) =
lJ
(mJ)(nIJopMJ)olK
(mJ)(nIKopMK)
lJ
(mK)(nLopMJ)olK
(mK)(pMK)
                                   (A.9) 
Given the production function  = rst6#s, factor prices u = (1 − )rs as the wage 
earning or returns to labour and R = rs#6 as the marginal product of capital and optimal 
savings &∗ = v6ov (1 − )r
s in addition to :7∗ < 1, it follows from the law of decreasing 
marginal returns to capital (DMRC) that there exists such a nontrivial relation (otherwise 
contradiction arises); R6
(SK) < R6
(SJ) = R7
(SJ) ≡ R(SJ), hence X∗ > 6∗, which is also the case 
due to higher minimum size requirement (Asmp. iii). Observing now that UV7 < T7 +
UV7 = T6 + UV6, decreasing marginal productivity once again implies that R7
(SK) > R6
(SJ) =
R7
(SJ) ≡ R(SJ) > R6
(SK). Finally, subtracting (A.7) from (A.6)  
(kJ#kK)
lJ
(mK)(nLopMJ)olK
(mK)(pMK)
wR6
(SK) − R7
(SK)x = (6#kJ)
lJ
(mY)(pMJ)olK
(mY)(pMK)
wR7
(SY) − R6
(SY)x     (A.10) 
From R6
(SK) < R7
(SK) it follows that R7
(SY) < R6
(SY) which, in turn, implies by DMRC that 
V7∗ > V6∗                                                        (A.11)  
Since the optimal condition was T6 + UV6 = T7 + UV7, it finally proves 
X∗ > 6∗ > 7∗                                                    (A.12) 
Equation (A.8) shows that the marginal product of capital or return on financial 
investments is equal across countries (no matter whether they are rich or poor) for the 
equilibrium subset of states f6∗ ≡ [0, :7∗], where the size of open sectors and the level of 
associated investments are lower. The eleventh equation implies that the insurance role of the 
safe asset is more important in Country 2 than in Country 1, so the risk free investments are 
higher in the poorer country. Ultimately, the inequality in Equation (A.12) means that larger 
scale and risky financial investments (X∗and 6∗)	are higher in the richer country. Because the 
return on risky assets is greater than the return on safe assets (i.e. T > U) and risky asset 
purchases increase with the size and number of open sectors within the countries, risky 
financial investments are more significant than safe ones. In other words, what is meant by 
international capital flows are essentially those risky financial investments that are promoted 
by return and diversification motives and take place across countries. Figure A.1 sketches the 
resulting aggregate equilibrium capital flows in this two-country world. Both equilibrium 
solutions at time  (recall that the time subscripts were dropped) and their aggregate images 
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in the figure (areas within the solid lines) demonstrate that more capital flows to the richer 
country in the short-run. 
Figure A.1: International Capital Flows in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) 
6[y 
																			Country	1	  
7[y 
																		Country	2	
\[ \[ 
b b 
X∗y  
6∗y  
7∗y 
 
     ` :7∗  		:6∗ 	1 E, :        ` 			:7∗   1 E, : 
 
This open economy model of optimal portfolio choice provides an alternative approach to 
the direction and allocation of international capital, which is different than the approaches 
previously considered. The model offers a time-dependent explanation and implies that the 
neoclassical view, that the new financial investments will accrue to poorer economies, can 
only be achieved in the long-run. In the short-run and under the governing assumptions of 
micro-level nonconvexities (or indivisibilities) and uncertainty, it expects the foreign capital 
to be destined to richer economies. Hence, there would be no paradox in such circumstances.  
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Appendix B: Difference GMM Estimations 
Table B.1: Difference GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 1 
0.638** 
(0.268) 
0.537** 
(0.259) 
0.492** 
(0.244) 
0.624** 
(0.248) 
0.501** 
(0.227) 
0.493** 
(0.206) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 2 
-0.312 
(0.202) 
-0.260 
(0.192) 
-0.219 
(0.182) 
-0.272 
(0.196) 
-0.226 
(0.171) 
-0.205 
(0.171) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.151 
(0.251) 
-0.0050 
(0.256) 
 
 
-0.0331 
(0.347) 
-0.149 
(0.341) 
 
 
Average institutional  
quality 
 
 
0.214*** 
(0.056) 
0.172*** 
(0.062) 
 
 
0.179*** 
(0.057) 
0.159*** 
(0.055) 
Log average per capita  
GDP (PPP$) 
  
0.261 
(0.275) 
   
Log average years  
of schooling 
   
0.426 
(0.439) 
0.262 
(0.409) 
0.226 
(0.295) 
Log average  
distance 
   
 
 
– 
 
– 
 
Log average  
remoteness 
   
 
 
0.0397 
(1.591) 
1.374 
(1.905) 
Average restrictions  
to capital mobility 
   
 
 
-0.298 
(0.296) 
-0.262 
(0.315) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (2005 US$)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.172 
(0.145) 
Observations 184 182 182 184 182 182 
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 
,- (+-value) 0.028 0.040 0.042 0.027 0.036 0.036 
,. (+-value) 0.810 0.689 0.515 0.678 0.632 0.569 
/01231	4 (+-value) 0.624 0.542 0.587 0.654 0.591 0.587 
Notes: See notes to Table 11.  
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Table B.2: Difference GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 1 
0.523* 
(0.262) 
0.570** 
(0.256) 
0.236 
(0.639) 
0.483*** 
(0.170) 
0.476 
(0.341) 
0.327 
(0.347) 
Average per capita 
equity flows,  − 2 
-0.261 
(0.193) 
-0.224 
(0.193) 
-0.0827 
(0.273) 
-0.279 
(0.168) 
-0.348 
(0.309) 
-0.397 
(0.293) 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.0615 
(0.249) 
0.110 
(0.260) 
0.314 
(0.562) 
 
 
0.0654 
(0.544) 
-0.0448 
(0.680) 
Average institutional  
quality 
0.224*** 
(0.059) 
0.240*** 
(0.064) 
0.166** 
(0.070) 
0.214*** 
(0.055) 
0.237*** 
(0.073) 
0.226*** 
(0.077) 
Log average trade 
openness 
-0.270 
(0.231) 
 
 
    
Log average deposit 
money bank assets  
 
 
-0.164 
(0.135) 
    
Log average  
TFP growth 
  
0.0182 
(0.020) 
   
Log per capita initial 
GCF (2005 $US) 
   
-0.0054 
(0.096) 
  
Malaria contagion 
risk  
    –  
Log average Int'l  
voice traffic 
     
0.165 
(0.103) 
Observations 182 166 139 181 139 112 
Countries 47 46 39 47 47 45 
,- (+-value) 0.042 0.040 0.325 0.017 0.120 0.146 
,. (+-value) 0.757 0.441 0.668 0.703 0.561 0.904 
/01231	4 (+-value) 0.512 0.604 0.561 0.613 0.516 0.549 
Notes: See notes to Table B.1. 
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Appendix C: Data and Samples  
Table C.1 Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Capital flows  Sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity flows (also 
known as total equity flows) expressed in per capita 
2005 $US.   
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank.  
Initial GDP  Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted per capita 
GDP as of the model-corresponding initial year 
(mostly 1970), expressed in 2005 $US and in logs.   
 Heston et al. (2009), Penn 
Wold Table (PWT), Center 
for International 
Comparisons of Production, 
Income and Prices (CIC), 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Institutional 
quality 
 A composite index constructed by adding up annual 
scores of twelve sub-indices (government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in 
politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability,  bureaucratic 
quality), rescaled by 10 and averaged over 1984-2006. 
 International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), Political Risk 
Services Group (PRS, 2007). 
Years of 
schooling 
 Educational attainment of total population aged 25 and 
over in some levels (primary, secondary or tertiary) for 
some years, averaged over 1970-2000 and expressed in 
logs. 
 Barro and Lee (2001). 
Distance  Unilateral distance constructed as a GDP weighted 
average of the geodesic distances between capital city 
of a country and capital cities of all the other countries 
in the world, averaged over 1970-2006 and expressed 
in logs. 
 Centre d'Etudes Prospectives 
et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) and 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank. 
Capital 
mobility 
restrictions 
 Taking values between 0 (if no restriction) and 1 (if 
there is restriction), it is the mean of four dummy 
variables (multiple exchange rate practices, restrictions 
on current account transactions, barriers on capital 
account dealings, and surrender and repatriation 
requirements for export proceeds), averaged over 
1970-2005. 
 Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER), 
IMF. 
Corporate tax   A percentage rate levied on the company profits in a 
country, averaged over 1999-2006. 
 Corporate and Indirect Tax 
Rate Survey (various years), 
KPMG. 
Trade openness  Exports plus imports expressed as a percentage of 
GDP and in logs, averaged over 1970-2006.  
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank.  
  (continued on next page) 
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Table E.1 (continued) 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Deposit money 
bank assets 
 Ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP, averaged 
over 1970-2006 and expressed in logs.     
 Financial Development and 
Structure Database, Beck et 
al. (2000). 
TFP growth  The effect of technological change, efficiency 
improvements and immeasurable contribution of all 
inputs other than capital and labour which is estimated 
as the residual (i.e. Törnqvist index) by subtracting the 
sum of two-period average compensation share of 
capital and labour inputs weighted by their respective 
growth rates from the output growth rate. Usage of log 
level differences delivers the annual percentage TFP 
growth rates averaged over 1982-2006.   
 Total Economy Database, 
The Conference Board 
(2010). 
Initial GCF  Gross capital formation (GCF) per capita as of the 
model-corresponding initial year (mostly 1970) refers 
to outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the 
economy plus net changes in the level of inventories, 
expressed in 2005 $US and in logs. 
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank. 
Malaria   The proportion of a country’s population at risk of 
falciparum malaria infection as of 1994.  
 Sachs (2003).  
Country risk  Countries are assessed in terms of credit risk and 
classified into eight numerical categories between 0 
(lowest credit risk) and 7 (highest credit risk) using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. Data is 
averaged over 1999-2006.     
 OECD, 2010.  
International 
voice traffic 
 The sum of international incoming and outgoing 
telephone calls in minutes divided by the total 
population, averaged over 1970-2006 and expressed in 
logs.   
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank. 
Foreign bank 
asset share 
 Equals to the share of foreign bank assets in total 
banking sector assets, averaged over 1990-1997. 
 Financial Development and 
Structure Database, Beck et 
al. (2000). 
European 
settler mortality 
 The mortality rates of European settlers per 1,000 
mean strength in the 19th century, expressed in logs. 
 Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
British legal 
origin 
 A dummy variable indicating whether the origin of the 
current formal legal code of a country is British 
common law. 
 La Porta et al. (1997). 
English 
language 
 Fraction of the population speaking English as mother 
tongue. 
 Hall and Jones (1999). 
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Table C.2: Country Samples 
Baseline Sample  IV Regressions Sample 
Algeria Kenya  Algeria Mexico 
Argentina Malawi  Argentina Nicaragua 
Bangladesh Malaysia  Bangladesh Niger 
Bolivia Mali  Bolivia Pakistan 
Botswana Mexico  Brazil Panama 
Brazil Nicaragua  Cameroon Papua New Guinea 
Bulgaria Niger  Chile Paraguay 
Cameroon Pakistan  China Peru 
Chile Panama  Colombia Senegal 
China Papua New Guinea  Costa Rica South Africa 
Colombia Paraguay  Dominican Republic Sri Lanka 
Costa Rica Peru  Ecuador Thailand 
Dominican Republic Philippines  Egypt Tunisia 
Ecuador Senegal  El Salvador Uruguay 
Egypt South Africa  Ghana Venezuela 
El Salvador Sri Lanka  Guatemala  
Ghana Thailand  Guyana  
Guatemala Tunisia  Honduras  
Guyana Turkey  India  
Honduras Uruguay  Indonesia  
India Venezuela  Jamaica  
Indonesia Zambia  Kenya  
Jamaica Zimbabwe  Malaysia  
Jordan   Mali  
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